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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

"SUMMIT" SUPPLEMENT



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

7 July 1955

The following is a summary of information received during the week on Soviet bloc preparations for the four-power conference.

General Soviet objectives and attitudes

Soviet propaganda: Several subjects for discussion at the four-power talks were again suggested in Soviet propaganda. A TASS article in Pravda on 5 July sought to show that there was "strong opposition" in some American circles to the discussion of disarmament. TASS said, however, that the pressure of public opinion and press speculation that it might be the "main theme" at Geneva made it very difficult for the US to avoid the question. In two other articles Pravda said the first business of the summit meeting will be to overcome the mutual lack of confidence and then attempt to settle the European security problem, with which the German question is closely linked. TASS also quoted a British paper to the effect that the Geneva agreement on Indochina would be "one of the most important questions" at the summit talks.

Soviets quiet down before summit: The French ambassador in Moscow commented to his Foreign Ministry that while previous US references to possible discussion of international Communism or the Satellites at Geneva had drawn quick reaction from the Soviet press, Secretary Dulles' San Francisco speech had not. He did not believe this indicated any lessening of Soviet unwillingness to discuss these topics, but felt rather that it indicated a high degree of Soviet interest in an at least ostensibly successful meeting. He supported this belief by pointing out that Soviet leaders are refraining from their usual preconference polemics or attempts to build up a maximum nuisance position for bargaining purposes.

Soviet press takes milder approach: The American embassy in Moscow reported that departing from normal practice, all leading Soviet papers, which on 30 June carried a three-inch TASS item on President Eisenhower's press conference of 29 June, carried a second report on 1 July with coverage expanded to 24 inches. The latter was a straightforward account in which tendentious comment was notably absent. The embassy commented that this coverage fitted into the recent pattern of a milder approach by the Soviet press to four-power talks and may also reflect Soviet comprehension that intemperate charges at this time might boomerang in terms of world opinion. The embassy believes that the Soviet reader, particularly in the context of earlier strong criticism of the US attitude, would tend to carry away the impression that the US no longer is "undermining" the conference and that positive results are somewhat more likely.

Pravda editorial recaptures sharp tone: The American embassy reported that an explanation for the 1 July "straight" press coverage of President Eisenhower's 29 June press conference was in large part furnished by a 2 July Pravda editorial devoted entirely to the question of the Satellites. The editorial stated that whether the President so intended or not, "his statement...appears to encourage a course of interference from without in the internal affairs of these states and is in contradiction to his correct and favorable proposal to reject cold war and use peaceful rather than provocative methods." The embassy comments that the editorial recaptures to a considerable extent the sharp tone which characterized

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Soviet comment on the US approach to the four-power meeting and reflects the depth of Soviet sensitivity on the question of the Satellites and the response to be expected to introduction of the subject at Geneva. [REDACTED]

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Soviet leaders attend Independence Day reception: The American embassy in Moscow reported that there could be no doubt the decision of the presidium to attend the embassy reception on 4 July was a spectacular gesture prior to Geneva. Five members of the presidium--Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov, Mikoyan and Pervukhin--came at 6:15, and Bulganin and Khrushchev came together some ten minutes later, all remaining until 7:40. The embassy thinks that Khrushchev's actions had been discussed and agreed on in the presidium. Despite the crush and other difficulties inherent in a reception of that kind, Khrushchev informed American chargé d'affaires Walmsley early that he had something to say, and notwithstanding crowding and interruptions, Khrushchev made his pre-Geneva speech. Walmsley compared notes later with the French, Dutch, British, and Italian ambassadors, who heard parts of the conversation and reported that "we were all impressed by what we might call strong leads from positions of weakness."

The French ambassador told Walmsley that he had asked Pervukhin what concrete measures the Soviet government had in mind for Geneva, and Pervukhin had replied "a detente." When the French ambassador asked what he meant specifically, Pervukhin said "this meeting should lead to others." [REDACTED]

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Satellites follow suit: Receptions held by American diplomatic missions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on 4 July were unusually well attended by Satellite and Soviet representatives, whose behavior was also unusually cordial. The American legation staff and other Western diplomats in Budapest were "stunned" by the unexpected "onslaught" on Soviet bloc diplomats and top-level Hungarian officials. Among those in attendance at the reception were party first secretary Rakosi, two deputy prime ministers, and the foreign minister. This was Rakosi's first appearance at a Western diplomatic reception since 1948. The legation commented that the turnout was particularly surprising in view of the American boycott of celebrations on Hungarian National Day in April. The Czech delegation attending the reception in Prague, although "typically more cautious than their Soviet mentors," included for the first time in several years a fairly high-level group headed by the foreign minister. Soviet bloc mission chiefs were also present, including the Hungarian ambassador, who had initially declined but who apparently later received orders to attend. The American embassy notes that attendance at the Canadian reception on 1 July was similar, but that the British reception for the queen's birthday on 9 June had been virtually boycotted. In Warsaw, a larger number of Polish officials than usual made an appearance and the atmosphere at the reception was "cordial."

Poland shows few signs of real friendliness toward US: In a lengthy resumé of the situation in Poland on the eve of the summit meeting, the American embassy in Warsaw states that notwithstanding the current talks on relaxation of tension and real "peace, good will and understanding among nations" (theme song on Polish radio

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broadcasts), there are few signs of real efforts to act more friendly toward the United States. While there has been some slight improvement in the few official and personal contacts the embassy has had with Foreign Ministry officials and a somewhat larger attendance at the 4 July reception, in contrast the United States during this pre-Summit period is the target for greater than usual abuse and misrepresentation in the local press. In addition, five spy trials have been paraded within the past two months alleging US intelligence instigation, in radio broadcasts US defense plans and military aid are continually played up in a war-mongering light, the Austrian treaty is misrepresented as solely a Soviet accomplishment, no mention is made of US assistance abroad in peaceful utilization of atomic energy (conversely Soviet "assistance" is overplayed), and Secretary Dulles is lampooned in cartoons as brooding how to "destroy" US atomic and hydrogen bombs by dropping them on defenseless cities and civilians. On the other hand, little is said against Britain and France. Great popular fervor was shown for the French during the Chopin festival and Britain has just come in for a good share of "good will and understanding" during the visit of the HMS Glasgow. [REDACTED]

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Italian views: Italian diplomats have offered two explanations of the unexpected Soviet visit to Belgrade. The Italian ambassador in Ankara held the view that the USSR was moving from a policy of expansion to a policy of preserving the status quo and wished, therefore, to establish a ring of buffer states for purely protective purposes. He believed that the USSR might offer Tito the leadership of a Balkan federation or at least control of Albania in order to obtain his participation in such an arrangement. The other school in Italian thinking was represented by the Italian ambassador in Belgrade, who believed that the USSR's objectives were greater than a ring of buffer states. He thought the USSR wanted to establish all of Central Europe, including Germany, in a neutral collective security arrangement, with Yugoslavia as the ideal starter. He believed that the principal Soviet objective was to get Allied troops out of Europe and that if this could be done, the unification of Germany would be permitted, the Cominform abolished, and national Communist groups encouraged. [REDACTED]

Luxembourg premier is skeptical: The premier and foreign minister of Luxembourg, Joseph Bech, told an American legation official on 8 June he does not feel that Russia is sincere in "her current role of peacemaker." He felt that through clever manipulations Russia is getting "considerable credit for lessening tensions which is not justly her due." The only explanation he saw for Russia's concluding the Austrian treaty was fear of the present and increasing strength of the West. The USSR's use of the Big Four conferences for propaganda purposes had lost its effectiveness, according to Bech, and it must now adopt a new scheme. He feared that at the proposed Big Four meeting, Russia would make some "utterly astonishing proposal or concession" in order to gain public acclaim and make propaganda. He envisioned some proposal as startling as really free German elections, which would only be a new type of smoke screen to cover the USSR's real objectives, namely, delaying West Germany's rearmament and getting the United States out of Europe. [REDACTED]

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Bulganin's authority at summit: Tito told Ambassador Riddleberger he believed Bulganin would be granted real power to negotiate at Geneva. [redacted]

Disarmament

Peaceful uses conference in Moscow: The Soviet Academy of Sciences' meeting on "scientific and technical problems of the peaceful use of atomic energy" opened in Moscow on 1 July. Among the foreign delegations attending were China, India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Japan, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Israel, Hungary, Finland, Sweden and Egypt. [redacted]

Germany

Soviet propaganda: The economic benefits that would flow from West German-Soviet relations and the allegedly growing demand in West Germany for trade with the USSR continue to be stressed in Soviet output.

First Soviet press article on Germany in several weeks: In the first article on the German question to appear in Moscow papers for several weeks, the 4 July Pravda strongly criticizes Secretary Dulles' statement to the effect that the USSR has apparently lost interest in unification of Germany. The article comments that this "false" assertion was "deliberately invented" with the aim of blaming the USSR should the Geneva conference (as a result of "hampering" action on the part of the West) not succeed. The article quotes Bulganin's 11 May statement that "we have been and remain supporters" of unification but also quotes his remark that "we have considered and now consider" that German remilitarization and inclusion in NATO is a "basic obstacle" to unification. The American embassy comments that the article leaves the question of unification in the context of an ultimate goal possibly to be reached after USSR-Federal Republic relations are normalized. [redacted]

Soviets not interested in reunification: Belgian foreign minister Spaak told the American ambassador in Brussels that the Yugoslav minister there had expressed the opinion that the Russians will not bring up the question of German reunification at the summit meeting and in fact do not even wish unification to be achieved. [redacted]

Tito's view: Ambassador Riddleberger reported that Tito said that he thought developments on Germany would emerge only gradually. [redacted]

An East German press release of 30 June stated that the premier's press office announced that the premier had relieved Willi Stoph, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, of his function as minister of the interior on Stoph's application. Inspector-General Karl Maron, chief of the German People's Police, was named to replace him. [redacted]

East German-West German relations: At a recent farewell luncheon for the Dutch ambassador to Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin was asked by the ambassador whether and when Adenauer would visit Moscow. Zorin said he was not sure, but that it must

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be fairly soon. To the question of whether Grotewohl had been informed in advance of the invitation and had approved, Zorin, after considerable delay and in an unconvincing manner, answered "yes." With reference to the possible "awkwardness" dual representation of Germany in Moscow might cause, Zorin said "not at all." He stated that the presence of two German ambassadors in Moscow, with the possibility of unobtrusive exchanges, would pave the way for direct conversation between the Federal Republic and East Germany, which Adenauer cannot afford to engage in now. [REDACTED]

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East German Communist attack on Adenauer reply to USSR: "Provocative act against Germany" was the headline used by Neues Deutschland, East German Communist Party organ, on its front-page story on the West German note to the USSR. It said the note confirms that the Federal Republic "is trying to torpedo all efforts directed toward reunification of Germany." The story attempted to prove that the content of the note and the setting of "conditions" reflected Bonn's desire to obstruct direct talks with the USSR in the interest of getting military legislation passed before the Geneva conference, and gave the lie to Adenauer's expressed desire to have the Geneva conference treat reunification. According to the story, Dulles and Adenauer "plotted" this "scandalous deception of the German people" as part of the general tactic directed toward "bringing about the collapse of the Geneva conference." [REDACTED]

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Status of the Satellites

Satellite propaganda: Satellite comment concerning the Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in Belgrade has been uniformly cautious in reaction to the assertion in the final communiqué on the talks that Communist states can follow independent paths to socialism depending on their internal conditions. This suggests that they have been directed by the USSR to play down this aspect of the Soviet-Yugoslav talks.

Resumé of the situation in Poland: In a lengthy resumé of the situation in Poland on the eve of the summit meeting, the American embassy in Warsaw observed that the Communist regime is still firmly in control with no detectable sign of any relaxation or change in methods and measures flowing from the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration. The embassy does not, however, discount the undermining influence of the "Belgrade accord" upon the minds of some Polish leaders and intellectuals which may some day bear fruit in efforts to shape trends along non-Cominform lines. In commenting on statements by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles concerning US unwillingness to accept the Satellite regimes as final, Polish Communist propaganda takes advantage of the fears of all Poles--not merely Communist and party followers--of a resurgent, rearmed Germany. The line is taken that the United States desires replacement of the present regime in Poland by one which would permit reopening of the Oder-Neisse Western boundary and East Prussia questions and return of some part at least of these areas to Germany. The embassy notes that the present regime is striving, more than ever, to gain the good will of the Polish people. This may be a planned drive to improve the regime's standing with Polish people against the day when the régime will bid for support in some new "free" elections. The embassy deduces that some Poles see in Nehru a possible neutral spokesman in the power struggle between the United States and the

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USSR. If this is true, the regime might lean toward a neutral status for Poland (and other Satellites) in return for a neutral Germany, with Nehru as the "salesman." The embassy points out there is no real food or clothing problem in Poland now and that people in such circumstances, especially the younger generation who know little else, are not likely to brood and breed revolution. The embassy sees no sign that the USSR intends to relinquish military (any more than political) control in Poland. [REDACTED]

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Spy trials aimed at Geneva: The American legation in Budapest reported that a Szabad Nep editorial of 3 July seems to dispel any remaining doubt as to the chief purpose behind the actions directed against the legation, widespread arrests, and the expected show trial. Contending that President Eisenhower's statements on the United States' desire to see cessation of the cold war are belied by the Hoover Commission report and Senator Knowland's legislative proposal, the editorial goes on to state that the "fact has not escaped our public either that ... American spying activity in the countries of the peace camp has increased in recent weeks." The editorial then reprints the substance of a recent official Hungarian news release and refers to trials in East Germany, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, concluding with the query whether this "smuggling of spies and diversionists into the people's democracies does not correspond more closely with other statements by President Eisenhower in which he encourages interferences in our internal affairs." The legation comments that the substance of this editorial leaves little doubt that current Hungarian actions are directed by the Kremlin and intended for use at Geneva. [REDACTED]

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Rumors rife in Prague: The American embassy in Prague reported that rumors are rife there that the Geneva conference will result in some special status for Czechoslovakia, usually envisaged as that of a neutral along Austrian lines. One of the wilder rumors is that Siroky returned from Moscow (or alternatively from a visit to the Soviet embassy) and angrily exclaimed, "They have sold us out." [REDACTED]

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Neutral belt

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Scandinavian fears of resurgent Germany: The American embassy in Warsaw has noted strong fears of a resurgent, reunited Germany on the part of Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish diplomatic representatives, especially if the future German army is to be trained by some of the former German generals who have been mentioned. [REDACTED]

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Soviet-Yugoslav relations: Ambassador Riddleberger in Belgrade reported some rumors that Tito's visit to Moscow may not take place until next year and in any case is not planned for the near future.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Related Far East intelligence

Chinese Communist maneuvers related to summit: The Chinese Nationalist minister in Manila has received word from Taipei that the build-up of troops and planes on the mainland is believed to be for military exercises in repelling imaginary invasion attempts from the offshore islands. His government believes that these maneuvers are timed to coincide with the summit meeting in order to convey a message of Red Chinese strength.

[REDACTED]

Tuapse case: A French Foreign Ministry official told the American ambassador in Paris that he felt that unless the Tuapse case was settled prior to 18 July, it might very well be raised in an embarrassing manner at Geneva.

[REDACTED]

Indochina: A French official told an American embassy officer in Saigon that the Viet Minh, on three recent occasions, had hinted at violent action in the south if a way was not found to get pre-election consultations started. The embassy comments that these reports indicate the Viet Minh is now cranking up a war of nerves on this issue. Sentiment also seems to be increasing among French and British officials in Saigon that unless a way out of the impasse is found soon, the Soviets will try to place the issue on the agenda at the Geneva talks.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Related Near and Middle East intelligence

Elements of Soviet neutralization campaign: Agence France Presse reported on 2 July that the latest issue of Kommunist has revised the Communist Party attitude toward Ghandi, and now hails him as a "progressive" where formerly he had been called a "reactionary and utopian" politician. The article also calls for a reappraisal of Kemal Ataturk and of the entire attitude of Soviet experts on Oriental questions. It calls for the rapid creation of philologic and economic specialists on China, India and South Asia.

[REDACTED]

Middle East to be issue at summit: The Iranian prime minister told the American ambassador in Tehran that the Iranian ambassador in Egypt had reported that the USSR intended bringing up for discussion at Geneva the situation in the Middle East and particularly Iran, presumably with the objective of creating a "neutral belt."

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